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Abstract. Quantum key distribution (QKD) refers to specific quantum strategies which permit
the secure distribution of a secret key between two parties that wish to communicate secretly.
Quantum cryptography has proven unconditionally secure in ideal scenarios and has been suc-
cessfully implemented using quantum states with finite (discrete) as well as infinite (continuous)
degrees of freedom. Here, we analyze the efficiency of QKD protocols that use as a resource
entangled gaussian states and gaussian operations only. In this framework, it has already been
shown that QKD is possible [1] but the issue of its efficiency has not been considered. We propose
a figure of merit (the efficiency E) to quantify the number of classical correlated bits that can be
used to distill a key from a sample of N entangled states. We relate the efficiency of the protocol
to the entanglement and purity of the states shared between the parties.
1. Introduction
Quantum cryptography relies on the possibility of establishing a secret random
key between two distant parties traditionally denoted as Alice and Bob. If the key
is securely distributed, the algorithms used to encode and decode any message can
be made public without compromising security. The key consists typically in a
random sequence of bits which both, Alice and Bob, share as a string of classi-
cally correlated data. The superiority of quantum cryptography comes from the
fact that the laws of quantum mechanics permit to the legitimate users (Alice and
Bob) to infer if an eavesdropper has monitored the distribution of the key and has
gained information about it. If this is the case, Alice and Bob will both agree in
Exemplary OSID style
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withdrawing the key and will start the distribution of a new one. In contrast, clas-
sical key distribution, no matter how difficult the distribution from a technological
point of view is, can always be intercepted by an eavesdropper without Alice and
Bob realizing it. In quantum cryptography, there exist several protocols that Alice
and Bob can use in order to establish a secret key. Some of them, like Ekert91 [2],
use as a resource shared entanglement between the two parties, while in others,
like BB84 [3], the key is established by sending non entangled quantum states
between the parties and communicating classically. If Alice and Bob share a col-
lection of distillable entangled states, they can always obtain from them a smaller
number of maximally entangled states from which they can establish a secure key
[4]. The number of singlets (maximally entangled states) that can be extracted
from a quantum state using only Local Operations and Classical Communication
(LOCC) is referred to as the Entanglement of Distillation ED. For establishing
a key, another important concept is the number of secret bits KD, that can be
extracted from a quantum state using LOCC. Since a secret bit can always be
extracted from a maximally entangled state, ED ≤ KD. There exist also quantum
states which are entangled but cannot be distilled, i.e., have ED = 0. They are
usually referred to as bound entangled states since its entanglement is bound to
the state. Nevertheless, for some of those states it has been shown that KD 6= 0,
and thus, they can be used to establish a secret key [5].
A particular case of states that cannot be “distilled” by “normal” procedures
are continuous variables gaussian states, e.g., thermal, coherent, and squeezed
states of light. By “normal” procedures we mean operations that preserve the
gaussian character of the state (gaussian operations). They correspond e.g., to
beam splitters, squeezers, mirrors, etc. Thus, in the gaussian scenario all entangled
gaussian states posses bound entanglement. Quantum cryptography with gaussian
states using gaussian operations has been experimentally implemented using “pre-
pare and measure schemes” with either squeezed or coherent states [6, 7]. Those
schemes do not demand entanglement between the parties.
Recently, Navascue´s et al. [1] have shown that it is also possible with only
gaussian operations to extract a secret key a` la Ekert91 from entangled gaussian
states, in spite the fact that these states are not gaussian distillable. In other
words, it has been shown that in the gaussian scenario all entangled gaussian
states fulfill GKD > 0 (where the letter G stands for gaussian) while GED = 0.
Alice and Bob can extract a list of classically correlated bits from a set a of 1× 1
entangled modes as follows: i) they agree on a value x0 > 0, ii) Alice (Bob)
measures the quadrature of each of her (his) modes XˆA(XˆB), iii) they accept only
outputs such that |xA| = |xB | = x0, iv) they associate e.g., the classical value
0(1) to xi = +x0(−x0), i = A,B and thus establish a list of classically correlated
bits. From there, they can apply Advantage Distillation [8] to establish the secret
key. This protocol is secure against individual eavesdropper attacks. Since the
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protocol is based on output coincidences of the measurements of the quadratures
which, by definition, are operators with a continuous spectrum, the protocol has
zero efficiency [1].
Here, we study the consequences of relaxing the above condition to a more
realistic scenario. We assume that Alice and Bob can extract a list of sufficiently
correlated classical bits obtained by accepting measurement outputs that do not
coincide but are bound within a range. We ask ourselves which is the possibility
that Alice and Bob can still distribute the key in a secure way under individual
and coherent attacks. We obtain that there exists always a finite interval for which
the protocol can be implemented successfully. The length of this interval depends
on the entanglement and on the purity of the shared states, and increases with
increasing entanglement.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the formalism needed
to tackle this problem. In Sect. 3, we first review the previous protocol [1] and
present our new results. Finally, we present our conclusions in Sect. 4.
2. Formalism
Systems of continuous variables are often expressed in terms of modes, where
each mode has two associated canonical degrees of freedom (“position” and “mo-
mentum”) which fulfill the canonical commutation relations (CCR). The CCR for
a quantum system with n modes can be compactly expressed via the symplectic
matrix. Denoting the canonical coordinates by
RˆT = (qˆ1, pˆ1, . . . , qˆn, pˆn) ≡ (Rˆ1, . . . , Rˆ2n),
the CCR simply read [Rˆi, Rˆj ] = i(Jn)ij , where i, j = 1, . . . , 2n and
Jn =
n⊕
i=1
J, J ≡
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (1)
The symplectic matrix J defines the symplectic scalar product and describes the
geometry of the phase space. There is a bijective map between a quantum state
described by a density matrix ρˆ (in an infinite Hilbert space) and its corresponding
characteristic function χρ, which is given by the Fourier-Weyl transform:
χρ(ζ) ≡ tr{ρˆWˆ(ζ)}, (2)
ρˆ ≡ 1
(2π)n
∫
d2nζ χρ(ζ)Wˆ(−ζ), (3)
where ζ ∈ R2n and Wˆζ = eiζT JnRˆ are the so-called Weyl operators. Gaussian
states are characterized by a gaussian χρ function,
χρ(ζ) = e
iζT ·Jn·d− 14ζT JTn ·γ·Jnζ, (4)
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where d is a 2n real vector, called displacement vector (DV), and γ is a 2n × 2n
symmetric real matrix, denoted as covariance matrix (CM). A convenient represen-
tation of gaussian quantum states is given in terms of the Wigner quasi-distribution
function Wρ [9], which is related to the characteristic function by the symplectic
Fourier transform which preserves the gaussian character,
Wρ(ζ) = 1
(2π)2n
∫
d2nη χρ(η)e
−iηT ·Jn·ζ, (5)
χρ(η) =
∫
d2nζWρ(ζ)eiηT ·Jn·ζ, (6)
where η ∈ R2n. Thus, a gaussian quantum state can equivalently be defined as a
quantum state whose Wigner function is gaussian,
Wρ(ζ) = 1
πn
√
detγ
e−(ζ−d)
T· 1
γ
·(ζ−d). (7)
d and γ are defined as:
di = tr(ρˆRˆi), (8)
γij = tr(ρˆ{Rˆi − diIˆ, Rˆj − dj Iˆ}), (9)
and are computed via the first and second moments of the characteristic function,
d′i = −i
∂
∂ζi
χρ(ζ)
∣∣∣∣
ζ=0
= tr(ρˆRˆ′i), (10)
γ′ij
2
+ d′id
′
j = (−i)2
∂2
∂ζi∂ζj
χρ(ζ)
∣∣∣∣
ζ=0
=
1
2
tr(ρˆ{Rˆ′i, Rˆ′j}), (11)
where Rˆ′i = JijRˆj, d
′
i = Jijdj and γ
′
ij = J
T
ikγklJlj .
In analogy with classical probability theory, the displacement vector d plays
the role of the mean value µi = E[xi], and the covariance matrix elements γ
play the role of the covariances Cij = Cov(xi, xj) = E[(xi − µi)(xj − µj)] of
a classical probability distribution. So only relative displacement vectors have
physical meaning and only the non block-diagonal terms of the covariance matrix
tell us about the quantum correlations present in the state.
Since the density matrix is a semidefinite positive operator, ρˆ ≥ 0, the cor-
responding covariance matrix must fulfill: γ + iJn ≥ 0. One can also define the
fidelity between continuous gaussian states in terms of Wigner functions. We use
here the Bures-Uhlmann fidelity between two arbitrary states ρˆ1 and ρˆ2 defined as
[10]
F(ρˆ1, ρˆ2) =
[
tr
√√
ρˆ1ρˆ2
√
ρˆ1
]2
,
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which coincides with the so called Hilbert-Schmidt fidelity
F(ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = tr(ρˆ1ρˆ2), (12)
whenever at least one of the states is pure. At the level of CM, using the Quantum
Parseval relation [11], the Hilbert-Schmidt fidelity between two gaussian states can
be written as:
F(ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = (2π)n
∫
d2nζW1(ζ)W2(ζ) =
=
1√
det
(
γ1+γ2
2
)e−(d2−d1)T ·
“
1
γ1+γ2
”
·(d2−d1) (13)
where γ1(2) and d1(2) belong to ρˆ1(2). Clearly, only relative DVs are of physical
significance. The purity of the state translates to P(γ) = tr(ρˆ2) = det(γ)−1/2 ≤ 1.
It is important to notice that gaussian states always admit a purification. Thus,
any mixed gaussian state of n modes can be expressed as the reduction of a pure
gaussian state of 2n modes of the form:
γ2n =
(
γn Cn
CTn θnγnθ
T
n
)
, Cn = Jn
√
−(Jnγn)2 − Iθn, θn =
n⊕
i=1
θ,
such that the mixed state can be obtained after tracing out nmodes from γ2n. Here
θ =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, which is the momentum reflection in phase-space, is the associated
symplectic operation.
For what follows it is also important to study entanglement properties in the
formalism of covariance matrices. A necessary and sufficient condition for separa-
bility for an arbitrary bipartite state is given in [12]. For the case 1× 1 and 1×N
modes a necessary and sufficient condition for separability is provided by the PPT
criterion [13] (for the rest of the states this criterion is only necessary but not
sufficient). The PPT criterion tells us that a state is entangled if and only if the
state ρˆ has non positive partial transposition (NPPT): ρˆTA < 0. In terms of CMs
this criterion reads θAγθ
T
A+iJ < 0. The second property, particularly relevant in
what follows, is that any NPPT gaussian state can be mapped by Gaussian Local
Operations and Classical Communication (GLOCC) to an NPPT symmetric state
of 1× 1 modes.
To quantify the entanglement of our states, we will use the logarithmic nega-
tivity as entanglement measure; LN(ρˆ) = log2 ||ρˆTA ||1, where ||Aˆ||1 = tr
√
Aˆ†Aˆ can
be easily computed through the sum of the singular values of Aˆ. One can extend
this measure to gaussian states of n modes through [14]:
LN(γn) = −
n∑
i=1
log2min(µ˜i, 1) (14)
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where {±µ˜i} = spec(−iJnγTAn ) i.e., the symplectic spectrum of the partial trans-
posed CM.
With this formalism at hand we now move to the presentation of our calcula-
tions and results.
3. Results
First, we summarize the main steps of the protocol used in [1]. Without loosing
generality, and by virtue of the properties of gaussian states, one should only
consider the case in which Alice and Bob share many copies of a quantum system
of 1 × 1 symmetric NPPT gaussian state ρˆAB. To extract a list of classically
correlated bits to establish a secret key, each party measures the quadratures of
her/his mode XˆA,B and accepts only those outputs xA,B for which both parties
have a consistent result |xA| = |xB | = x0. With probability p(i, j), each party
associates the classical bit i = 0(1) to her/his outcome +x0(−x0). The probability
that their symbols do not coincide is given by ǫAB = (
∑
i 6=j p(i, j))/(
∑
i,j p(i, j)).
Having fixed a string of N classical correlated values, they can apply classical
advantage distillation [8]. To this aim, Alice generates a random bit b and encodes
her string ofN classical bits into a vector~b of lengthN such that bAi+bi = b mod 2.
Bob checks that for his symbols all results bBi + bi = b
′ mod 2 are consistent, and
in this case accepts the bit b. The new error probability is given by
ǫAB,N =
(ǫAB)
N
(1− ǫAB)N + (ǫAB)N ≤
(
ǫAB
1− ǫAB
)N
, (15)
which tends to zero for sufficiently large N . The most general scenario for eaves-
dropping is to assume that Eve has access to the states before their distribution.
Hence, the states that Alice and Bob share correspond to the reduction of a pure 4-
mode state. Now security with respect to individual attacks from the eavesdropper
Eve, can be established if
(
ǫAB
1− ǫAB
)N
< |〈e++|e−−〉|N , (16)
where |e±±〉 denotes the state of Eve once Alice and Bob have projected their
states onto | ± x0〉. Notice that Eve can gain information if the overlap between
her states after Alice and Bob have measured coincident results is sufficiently small.
The above inequalities come from the fact that in the case of individual attacks
the error on Eve’s estimation of the final bit b is bound from below by a term
proportional to |〈e++|e−−〉|N [1]. Therefore, Alice and Bob can establish a key if
ǫAB
1− ǫAB < |〈e++|e−−〉|. (17)
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In [1] it was shown that any 1 × 1 NPPT state fulfills the above inequality and
thus any NPPT gaussian state can be used to establish a secure key in front of
individual eavesdropper attacks.
Let us now present our results. Notice that since security relies on the fact that
Alice and Bob have better correlations than the information the eavesdropper can
learn about their state, perfect correlation is not a requirement to establish a secure
key. We denote Alice’s outputs by x0A and we calculate which are the outputs
Bob can accept so that the correlation established between Alice and Bob outputs
can be used to extract a secret bit.
We use the standard form of a bipartite 1× 1 mode gaussian state,
γAB =


λA 0 cx 0
0 λA 0 −cp
cx 0 λB 0
0 −cp 0 λB

 (18)
with λA,B ≥ 0, and cx ≥ cp ≥ 0 (we can shift the DV to 0). The gaussian state is
called symmetric if λA = λB = λ and fully symmetric if also cx = cp. We shall deal
with mixed symmetric states. The positivity condition reads (λ− cx)(λ+ cp) ≥ 1,
while the entanglement NPPT condition is given by (λ − cx)(λ − cp) < 1. As in
[1], we impose that the global state including Eve is pure (she has access to all
degrees of freedom outside Alice an Bob) while the mixed symmetric state, shared
by Alice and Bob is just its reduction,
γABE =
(
γAB C
CT θγABθ
T
)
, (19)
C = JAB
√
−(JABγAB)2 − I2 θAB =


0 −X 0 −Y
−X 0 −Y 0
0 −Y 0 −X
−Y 0 −X 0

 , (20)
θAB = θA ⊕ θB, JAB = JA ⊕ JB , (21)
where
X =
√
a+ b+
√
a− b
2
,
Y =
√
a+ b−√a− b
2
,
and a = λ2 − cxcp − 1, b = λ(cx − cp).
Performing a measurement with uncertainty σ, the probability that Alice finds
±|x0A| while Bob finds ±|x0B |, is given by the overlap between the state of Al-
ice and Bob, ρˆAB, and a pure product state ρˆA,i ⊗ ρˆB,j (with i, j = 0, 1) of
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gaussians centered at ±|x0A|(±|x0B |) respectively with σ width (notice ρˆA,0 ≡
|+ |x0A|〉〈+|x0A||). We use here the Hilbert-Schmidt fidelity which leads to:
p(0, 0) = p(1, 1) = tr[ρˆAB(ρˆA,0 ⊗ ρˆB,0)] =
= (2π)4
∫
d4ζABWρAB (ζAB)WρA,0⊗ρB,0(ζAB) =
= K(σ) exp
(
2|x0A||x0B |cx − (λ+ σ2)(x20A + x20B)
(λ+ σ2)2 − c2x
)
,
(22)
for the probability that their symbols do coincide and,
p(0, 1) = p(1, 0) = K(σ) exp
(−2|x0A||x0B |cx − (λ+ σ2)(x20A + x20B)
(λ+ σ2)2 − c2x
)
, (23)
for the probability that they do not coincide, where
K(σ) =
4σ2√
(λ+ σ2)2 − c2x
√
(λσ2 + 1)2 − c2pσ4
. (24)
The error probability for σ → 0 reads
ǫAB = lim
σ→0
∑
i 6=j p (i, j)∑
i,j p (i, j)
=
1
1 + exp
(
4cx|x0A||x0B|
λ2−c2x
) . (25)
Let us calculate the state of Eve |e±±〉 after Alice has projected onto | ± |x0A|〉
and Bob onto | ± |x0B |〉:
γ++ = γ−− =
(
γx 0
0 γ−1x
)
, γx =
(
λ cx
cx λ
)
, (26)
d±± = ∓


0
0
Aδx0 −B∆x0
Aδx0 +B∆x0

 , (27)
where A =
√
a+b
λ+cx
, B =
√
a−b
λ−cx , ∆x0 = |x0B | − |x0A| and δx0 = |x0B | + |x0A|. The
overlap between the two states of Eve is given by:
|〈e++|e−−〉|2 = exp
(
−4
λ2 − c2x
[(
x20A + x
2
0B
2
)
(λ2 − c2x − 1)λ+
+ |x0A||x0B |
(
cx − cp(λ2 − c2x)
) ])
. (28)
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Substituting Eqs. (25) and (28) into (17) one can check, after some algebra, that
the inequality (17) reduces to:(
x20A + x
2
0B
2
)
(λ2 − c2x − 1)λ+ |x0A||x0B |
(−cx − cp(λ2 − c2x)) < 0. (29)
Notice that condition (29) imposes both, restrictions on the parameters defining
the state (λ, cx, cp), and on the outcomes of the measurements (x0A, x0B). The
constraints on the state parameters are equivalent to demand that the state is
NPPT and satisfies
(λ− cx)(λ+ cx) ≥ 1. (30)
Nevertheless, as cx ≥ cp, any positive state fulfills this condition. Hence for any
NPPT symmetric state, there exists, for a given x0A, a range of values of x0B such
that secret bits can be extracted (Eq. (17) is fulfilled). This range is given by
∆x0 = |x0B | − |x0A| ∈ Dα =
[
2
−√α− 1 ,
2√
α− 1
]
|x0A|, (31)
where
α =
(
cx − λ
cx + λ
)[
1− (λ+ cx)(λ+ cp)
1− (λ− cx)(λ− cp)
]
. (32)
After Alice communicates |x0A| to Bob, he will accept only measurement outputs
within the above interval. The interval ∆x0 is well defined if α ≥ 1, which equivals
to fulfill Eq. (30). Notice also that the interval is not symmetric around |x0A|
because the probabilities calculated in Eqs. (22) and (23) do depend on this value
in a non symmetric way. The length of the interval of valid measurements outputs
for Bob is given by
Dα =
4
√
α
α− 1 |x0A|. (33)
It can be observed that maximal Dα → ∞ (α = 1) corresponds to the case when
Alice and Bob share a pure state (Eve is disentangled from the system) and thus
condition (17) is always fulfilled. On the other hand, any mixed NPPT symmetric
state (α > 1) admits a finite Dα. This ensures a finite efficiency on establishing a
secure secret key in front of individual attacks.
If we assume that Eve performs more powerful attacks, namely finite coherent
attacks, then security is only guaranteed if [1]:
ǫAB
1− ǫAB < |〈e++|e−−〉|
2. (34)
This condition is more restrictive than (17). With a similar calculation as before
we obtain that now security is not guaranteed for all mixed entangled symmetric
NPPT states, but only for those that also satisfy:
λ− (λ+ cx)(λ− cx)(λ− cp) > 0. (35)
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For such states, and given a measurement result x0A of Alice, Bob will only accept
outputs within the range:
∆x0 = |x0B | − |x0A| ∈ Dβ =
[
2
−√β − 1 ,
2√
β − 1
]
|x0A|, (36)
where
β =
2λ(λ2 − c2x − 1)
λ− (λ+ cx)(λ− cx)(λ− cp) ≥ 1. (37)
Eqs. (30) and (35) already guarantee that β ≥ 1.
Let us now focus on the efficiency issue. We define the efficiency E(γAB) of the
protocol for a given state γAB, as the average probability of obtaining a classically
correlated bit. Explicitly,
E(γAB) =
∫
∆x0∈D
dx0Adx0B(1− ǫAB)tr(ρˆAB|x0A, x0B〉〈x0A, x0B |). (38)
The marginal distribution in phase-space is easily computed by integrating the
corresponding Wigner function in momentum space [15]:
tr(ρˆAB |x0A, x0B〉〈x0A, x0B |) =
∫ ∫
dpAdpBWρAB (ζAB) =
=
exp
(
2cxx0Ax0B−λ(x20A+x20B)
λ2−c2x
)
π
√
λ2 − c2x
,
(39)
but the final expression of (38) has to be calculated numerically. Note that if
Alice and Bob share as a resource N identical states (NPPT states for individual
attacks, and NPPT states fulfilling (35) for finite coherent attacks), the number
of classically correlated bits that can be extracted from them is ∼ N × E(γAB).
The efficiency (38) increases with increasing D and decreasing ǫAB . In particular,
for the protocol given in [1], D = 0, and therefore E(γAB) = 0 for any state.
We investigate now the dependence of E(γAB) on the entanglement of the
NPPT mixed symmetric state used for the protocol as well as on the purity of the
state. As a measure of the entanglement between Alice and Bob we compute the
logarithmic negativity
LN(γAB) = log2
(
1√
(λ− cx)(λ− cp)
)
> 0. (40)
In Fig. 1, we display the efficiency of the protocol (assuming individual attacks)
versus entanglement shared between Alice and Bob for different states γAB . There
is not a one-to-one correspondence between E(γAB) and entanglement, since states
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Fig. 1: Protocol efficiency (quantified by E(γAB)) versus the entanglement mea-
sured by logarithmic negativity LN(γAB). The shading from black to white corre-
sponds to purities from zero to one.
with the same entanglement can have different purity, which can lead to different
efficiency. This is so because there are two favorable scenarios to fulfill (17). The
first one is to demand large correlations so that the relative error ǫAB of Alice and
Bob is small. The second scenario happens when Alice and Bob share a state with
high purity, i.e., Eve is very disentangled. In this case, independently of the error
ǫAB , (17) can be fulfilled more easily.
Despite the fact that efficiency generally increases with increasing entangle-
ment, this enhancement, as depicted in the figure, is a complex function of the
parameters involved. Nevertheless, one can see that there exist an entanglement
threshold (around LN(γAB) ≃ 0.2) below which the protocol efficiency diminishes
drastically no matter how mixed are the states shared between Alice and Bob.
It is also illustrative to examine the dependence of α (which determines the
interval length Dα) on the entanglement of the states shared by Alice and Bob.
In Fig. 2 we plot the logarithmic negativity of a given state versus the parameter
α. States with the same entanglement but different purity are associated to quite
different values of α. Nevertheless states with high entanglement permit a large
interval length (small α) and, thus, high efficiency.
In both, Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, we have observed that states with different en-
tanglement give the same efficiency. However it is important to point out that
to extract the key’s bits, classical advantage distillation [8] stills needs to be per-
formed. The efficiency of Maurer’s protocol, strongly increases with decreasing
ǫAB , and, therefore, the states with higher entanglement will provide a higher key
rate.
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Fig. 2: Entanglement of the states shared between Alice and Bob measured in
terms of the logarithmic negativity LN(γAB) versus the parameter α(γAB) under
individual attacks. The shading from black to white corresponds to purities from
zero to one.
4. Conclusions
Efficiency is a key issue for any experimental implementation of quantum cryp-
tography since available resources are not unlimited. Here, we have shown that
the sharing of entangled gaussian variables and the use of only gaussian operations
permits efficient quantum key distribution against individual and finite coherent
attacks. All mixed NPPT symmetric states can be used to extract secret bits
under individual attacks whereas under finite coherent attacks and additional con-
dition has to be fulfilled. We have introduced a figure of merit (the efficiency
E) to quantify the number of classical correlated bits that can be use to distill a
key from a sample of N entangled states. We have observed that this quantity
grows with the entanglement shared between Alice and Bob. This relation it is
not one-to-one due to the fact that states with less entanglement but purer (Eve
more disentangled) can be equally efficient. Nevertheless as we have pointed out,
these states would be, inefficient in the distillation of the key. Finally, we would
like to remark that our study is not restricted to quantum key distribution proto-
cols, but can be extended to any other protocol that uses as a resource entangled
continuous variable states to establish a set of classically correlated bits between
distant parties [16].
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